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Equality in Global Commerce: 
Towards a Political Theory of  
International Economic Law
Oisin Suttle* 
Abstract
Notwithstanding International Economic Law’s (IEL’s) inevitable distributional effects, IEL 
scholarship has had limited engagement with theoretical work on global distributive justice and 
fairness. In part this reflects the failure of  global justice theorists to derive principles that can be 
readily applied to the concrete problems of  IEL. This article bridges this gap, drawing on existing 
coercion-based accounts of  global justice in political theory to propose a novel account of  global 
distributive justice that both resolves problems within the existing theoretical literature and can 
be directly applied to both explain and critique concrete issues in IEL, including in particular 
WTO law. By complementing existing coercion-based accounts with a more nuanced typology 
of  international coercion, it distinguishes two morally salient classes of  economically relevant 
measures: External Trade Measures (ETMs), which pursue their goals specifically through 
the regulation of  international economic activity; and Domestic Economic Measures (DEMs), 
which do not. The distinctive intentional relationship between ETMs and the outsiders they 
affect means such measures require more stringent justification, in terms of  global equality or 
other goals those outsiders themselves share; whereas DEMs can be justified under the principle 
of  self-determination. Non-Product Related Production Processes and Methods (NPRPPMs) 
provide a case study to show how this framework can illuminate recurring problems in IEL.
1 The Inevitability of  Distributive Justice
International economic law (IEL) has globally distributive effects. Border measures 
affect terms of  trade and restrict transactional opportunities for both insiders and out-
siders. Domestic measures have growth effects both within and between countries. 
Competition and state aid rules affect prices, changing incentives for market partici-
pants and the expected returns from economic activity. Further, those effects cannot 
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be understood solely in terms of  efficiency. While the theory of  comparative advan-
tage supports a general scepticism towards protectionist policies, few, if  any, policy 
interventions can be condemned as unequivocally harmful in all circumstances.1 
Probabilistic empirical evidence bolsters theoretical claims, but cannot alone justify 
either the broad reach of  WTO disciplines or the interest of  outsiders in enforcing 
these.2 It is only by invoking prisoner’s dilemmas, and the language of  externali-
ties, that we approach a defence of  the trade regime as globally efficient.3 However, 
by invoking the language of  tit-for-tat, such arguments concede both that there are 
multiple pareto-efficient regimes and (which amounts to the same thing) that a glob-
ally optimal outcome may not be locally optimal. In these circumstances, any rule 
necessarily benefits one group at the expense of  another, taking us from the realm of  
efficiency to the realm of  distributional fairness.4
That issues of  distributive justice arise in the trade regime is not a novel claim. As 
a political token, ‘fair trade’ is frequently invoked to oppose ‘free trade’, whether by 
developing countries demanding special and differential treatment, by trade unions 
seeking protection from low-wage countries, or by civil society activists raising social, 
environmental, and human rights concerns.5 In each case, ‘fairness’ is co-opted to 
support an argument that existing or proposed rules give insufficient weight to some 
important interest, usually that of  its advocates, and that costs and benefits from 
international cooperation should be distributed differently. However, whereas fair-
ness claims are inevitable and pervasive, there is little consensus on their implica-
tions for specific questions. In many cases, it seems, fairness appears on both sides 
of  an issue. How should we reconcile developed countries’ claims to equal treatment 
with developing countries’ claims to policy space? How can we weigh the interests of  
threatened workers in developed countries against their low-wage competitors over-
seas? Should activists’ concerns for environmental goods restrict exporting coun-
tries’ rights to economic self-determination? If  fairness can be invoked by disputants 
on both sides of  such diverse issues, is it any surprise that critics dismiss fairness 
claims as devoid of  content, a rhetorical flourish disguising vested interests or eco-
nomic illiteracy?6
Part of  this confusion can be explained in instrumental terms. Their rhetorical 
power gives political actors reason to cast purely self-interested arguments in terms 
1 J. Bhagwati, Protectionism (1988). For a critical view see Rodrik, ‘Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello 
Washington Confusion? A Review of  the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a 
Decade of  Reform’, 44 J Econ Literature (2006) 973.
2 Regan, ‘What Are Trade Agreements For? Two Conflicting Stories Told by Economists, with a Lesson for 
Lawyers’, 9 J Int’l Econ L (2006) 951.
3 K. Bagwell and R.W. Staiger, The Economics of  the World Trading System (2002); Ethier, ‘Political 
Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World’, 12 Rev Int’l Economics (2004) 303; P.R. 
Krugman, M. Obstfeld, and M.J. Melitz, International Economics (2012), at 254–256, 283–285.
4 On the justificatory limits of  economics see Howse, ‘From Politics to Technocracy – and Back Again: The 
Fate of  the Multilateral Trading Regime’, 96 AJIL (2002) 94.
5 See, e.g., R.E. Hudec and J.N. Bhagwati (eds), Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? 
(1996); J.E. Stiglitz and A. Charlton, Fair Trade for All: How Trade Can Promote Development (2007).
6 See, e.g., J.L. Goldsmith and E.A. Posner, The Limits of  International Law (2005), at 167–184.
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Towards a Political Theory of  International Economic Law 1045
of  fairness and justice.7 However, it also reflects a deeper problem. We lack a devel-
oped account of  what distributional fairness means in international economic regula-
tion. In the domestic context it has been a concern for both jurists and philosophers 
at least since Aristotle, and we have many well-specified theories expressed in terms 
like liberty, equality, welfare, and community. Internationally, on the other hand, with 
limited exceptions this question became a focus of  theoretical study only in the last 
40 years.8 Empirical disagreements are starker, intuitions are less settled, and to the 
extent that progress is made at the level of  theory, it struggles to inform applied work 
by legal scholars and policy practitioners. We simply do not know what distributive 
justice means in the international economy. The resultant scepticism of  global fair-
ness claims is reflected in the continued hegemony of  legal positivism and economic 
analysis in world trade law.9
This article seeks to redress this balance, drawing on recent debates in global politi-
cal theory to develop an account of  distributive justice specifically adapted to inter-
national economic regulation. As a political theory, it applies the methods of  political 
philosophy to derive a distinctive set of  global distributive claims. However, as a the-
ory of  economic regulation, it seeks to specify those claims in ways that can directly 
inform questions addressed in the applied literature on world trade law, and indeed 
in international negotiations and dispute settlement procedures. A successful theory 
must achieve both goals: theory that cannot inform practice is normatively sterile; but 
practical applicability cannot compensate for a lack of  theoretical rigour.
My conclusions can be stated in a few lines; the bulk of  the article is devoted to 
defending these, and to briefly highlighting their implications for WTO law. Building on 
existing coercion-based accounts of  global justice, I distinguish two normatively salient 
categories of  economic regulation, which I label external trade measures and domestic 
economic measures. The former, I argue, establish a distinctive justificatory relation-
ship between states and those outside their borders, evoking justification in globally 
egalitarian terms or in terms of  values those outsiders are themselves committed to 
pursuing. Such measures, and their effects, are properly called unjust to the extent that 
they are not so justified. Domestic economic measures, by contrast, can be justified to 
outsiders without reference to the goals they pursue, subject to the side-constraints of  
basic rights and self-determination. Distributive justice thus means something quite 
different, depending on the kinds of  measures considered. By taking this distinction 
seriously we can make sense both of  our varied intuitions about economic regulation 
and global justice, and of  recurring problems in international trade law.
Section 2 introduces a number of  approaches to theorizing global distributive jus-
tice, emphasizing how global justice debates polarize around statist and cosmopolitan 
positions, and linking this to their failure to engage with concrete policy questions. It 
argues that the Coercion Approach, which links distributive justice to state coercion, 
7 Dunoff, ‘The Political Geography of  Distributive Justice’, in C. Carmody, F. Garcia, and J. Linarelli (eds), 
Global Justice and International Economic Law (2012), at 153; Narlikar, ‘Fairness in International Trade 
Negotiations: Developing Countries in the Gatt and WTO’, 29 World Economy (2006) 1005.
8 For a review of  the problems see Nagel, ‘The Problem of  Global Justice’, 33 Phil & Public Affairs (2005) 113.
9 E.A. Posner and A.O. Sykes, Economic Foundations of  International Law (2013), at 4, 263.
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is most promising, but lacks a sufficiently nuanced understanding of  coercion in the 
global system.
Section 3 generalizes the Coercion Approach, adapting a framework from John Rawls 
to reconceive that approach and its distributive implications as expressing an ideal of  
institutional justification. It further argues that structural differences between domestic 
and international systems recast the questions raised by Rawls, forcing us to consider the 
plural coercive relations in which institutions, peoples, and persons stand internationally.
Sections 4 to 6 develop a typology of  institutional coercion and its justification that 
addresses the problems identified in sections 2 and 3. Three salient distinctions are 
drawn: between direct and indirect coercion; between inclusive and exclusive coer-
cion; and between self-authored and external coercion. The form coercion takes 
affects the justification it evokes; and only a subset of  globally coercive measures evoke 
justification in distributive terms.
Section 7 applies this typology to reconstruct the Coercion Approach and to derive 
two novel principles of  international economic justice. The first, labelled the Principle of  
Equality in Global Commerce (EGC), claims that measures that pursue their goals specifi-
cally through the regulation of  international economic activity (External Trade Measures 
or ETMs) are just if, and only if, they pursue global equality of  individual opportunity, 
through improving the position of  less advantaged persons, subject to a reasonable prin-
ciple of  self-determination. The second, a corollary of  the first, provides that measures 
other than ETMs are just, regardless of  their distributive implications, provided they do 
not impair the basic rights of  outsiders or undermine the capacity of  other peoples to 
become or remain well ordered. International economic inequality is thus relevant to the 
justification of  some measures that states may adopt, but for many others their justice 
depends only on sufficientarian concerns of  basic rights and collective self-determination.
Section 8 shows how the two principles derived in section 7 can be applied to ana-
lyse concrete problems in IEL. Taking environmentally motivated regulations on 
non-product related production processes and methods (NPRPPMs) as a case study, it 
shows how these principles explain the relationship between GATT Articles I, III, XI, 
and XX. It concludes by identifying a number of  other problematic issues in WTO law 
that these principles can potentially illuminate.
2 From Global Justice to Justice in Economic Regulation
Many people believe that states should pursue, to a greater or lesser degree, economic 
equality among their citizens. Further, many states, through public services, wel-
fare payments, and progressive taxation, do in fact pursue that goal, albeit to a lesser 
extent than many egalitarians might prefer. In political theory, the most influential 
statement of  this goal is John Rawls’ difference principle, which claims that in a just 
society, ‘[s]ocial and economic inequalities … are to be to the greatest benefit of  the 
least advantaged members of  society’.10 Starting from a baseline of  strict equality, it 
permits economic inequalities only subject to fair equality of  opportunity, and only to 
10 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1996), at 6.
 at R
oyal H
allam
shire H
ospital on M
arch 18, 2015
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Towards a Political Theory of  International Economic Law 1047
the extent that such inequalities benefit the worst off  persons in society. Gains for the 
more advantaged count for nothing, on this view, if  they come at a cost for the less 
advantaged. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that this principle, once revolution-
ary, constitutes the conventional wisdom about distributive justice within the state.11
However, some of  the earliest responses to Rawls’s work observed that his argu-
ment for the difference principle within individual societies seemed to apply equally 
to the world as a whole.12 Rawls argues from moral equality to the difference prin-
ciple; but if  respect for moral equality implies the difference principle, and assuming 
we are to respect the moral equality of  all persons everywhere, why does the differ-
ence principle not apply globally? This is contemporary liberalism’s boundary prob-
lem, around which much of  contemporary global justice theorizing resolves. In so far 
as IEL addresses the interface between local and global, how we resolve this problem 
should profoundly affect our views on IEL.
Responses to this problem can be loosely divided into three groups, none entirely sat-
isfactory: first, strong cosmopolitans, who accept that the logic of  liberalism extends 
beyond the state and argue for the same distributive principles globally that they 
favour domestically;13 secondly, communitarians, who reject the liberal derivation 
of  distributive justice from moral equality, instead grounding distributive principles 
in social meanings and obligations within communities;14 and thirdly, liberals who 
defend Rawls’s arguments domestically while arguing that specific features of  social 
cooperation within the state distinguish the domestic and international contexts, 
making the difference principle appropriate to the former but not the latter.15 Features 
emphasized have included coercion, cooperation, joint production of  public goods, 
political cooperation, and the presence of  basic institutions or a basic structure.16
Among those who reject the strong cosmopolitan position, a further distinction 
appears between those who deny any duties of  economic justice beyond the state17 
and those who, while denying that identical principles apply within and beyond the 
state, advocate lesser, generally sufficientarian, principles of  global economic justice. 
Depending on whether they emphasize duties to nations, peoples, or persons, theories 
11 For an overview of  the vast literature on this question see Lamont and Favor, ‘Distributive Justice’, in E.N. 
Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy (2013), available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2013/entries/justice-distributive/.
12 B. Barry, The Liberal Theory of  Justice: A Critical Examination of  the Principal Doctrines in a Theory of  Justice 
by John Rawls (1973), at 128–133; Scanlon, ‘Rawls’ Theory of  Justice’, 121 U Pennsylvania L Rev (1972–
1973) 1020, at 1066–1067.
13 See, e.g., C.R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (1999); S. Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: 
A Global Political Theory (2005); T.W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (1989).
14 See, e.g, D. Miller, On Nationality (1995); M. Walzer, Spheres of  Justice: A Defence of  Pluralism and Equality 
(1983).
15 See, e.g., S.R. Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy (2007); 
J. Rawls, The Law of  Peoples (1999); Blake, ‘Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy’, 30 Phil 
& Public Affairs (2001) 257; Nagel, supra note 8; Sangiovanni, ‘Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State’, 
35 Phil & Public Affairs (2007) 3.
16 For a critical review of  these approaches see Barry and Valentini, ‘Egalitarian Challenges to Global 
Egalitarianism: A Critique’, 35 Rev Int’l Studies (2009) 485.
17 See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 8.
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of  the latter type are characterized as liberal nationalist,18 social liberal,19 or moderate 
cosmopolitan,20 and collectively as moderate theories.21
These internal divisions explain in part political theory’s limited success in informing 
debates amongst international economic lawyers and policy-makers. However, more 
problematic is the difficulty these theories have in engaging with concrete problems 
of  IEL.22 Strong cosmopolitans, denying the moral distinctiveness of  the state, struggle 
to provide principled accounts of  international law for a world where states remain 
the fundamental units.23 Moderate theorists, on the other hand, require contestable 
causal arguments to link specific economic measures to breaches of  their preferred suf-
ficientarian standards,24 while their rejection of  comparative standards risks sidelining 
them in many forums of  international economic regulation.25 Further, international 
economic regulation (as opposed to redistribution) has not been a prominent focus for 
political theorists;26 and where they have addressed specific issues in economic regula-
tion, it can be difficult to see how their practical recommendations derive from their 
theoretical claims.27 The result has been the effective exclusion of  political theory from 
debates about IEL, which have instead been informed primarily by legal positivism and 
utilitarian economic theory;28 even when the limits of  those approaches are recog-
nized, lawyers have rarely looked to political theory for guidance.29
A successful account of  distributive justice in international economic regulation must 
therefore find a middle path between these positions, combining statist pragmatism with 
the critical power of  cosmopolitans’ commitment to moral equality. Its prescriptions for 
18 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 14. Cf. D. Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (2007).
19 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 15, Rawls, supra note 15.
20 See, e.g., A.E. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law 
(2004); T.W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (2002); 
L. Valentini, Justice in a Globalized World: A Normative Framework (2011).
21 S. Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of  Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (2001), at 
116.
22 A. James, Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy (2012), at 9–14.
23 See, e.g., D.  Moellendorf, Global Inequality Matters (2009), at 96–103; F.  Garcia, Trade, Inequality, and 
Justice: Towards a Liberal Theory of  Just Trade (2003), at 147.
24 See, e.g., Howse and Teitel, ‘Global Justice, Poverty and the International Economic Order’, and Pogge, 
‘The Role of  International Law in Reproducing Massive Poverty’, both in J. Tasioulas and S. Besson (eds), 
The Philosophy of  International Law (2011), at 437 and 417, respectively.
25 Consider, e.g., debates about addressing development in the trade regime: S.E. Rolland, Development at the 
World Trade Organization (2012), at 1–9.
26 Teson and Klick, ‘Global Justice and Trade’, in Carmody, Garcia, and Linarelli (eds), supra note 7, at 217
27 See, e.g., the comments on international trade regulation in Rawls, supra note 15, at 42–43.
28 Garcia, Barry, and Esserman, ‘Why Trade Law Needs a Theory of  Justice’, 100 ASIL Proc (2006) 376; 
Hockett, ‘Human Persons, Human Rights and the Distributive Structure of  Global Justice’, in Carmody, 
Garcia, and Linarelli (eds), supra note 7, at 68.
29 Howse, supra note 4. Human rights law has instead provided the most prominent critical perspective on 
WTO law: see T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn, and E.B. Bonanomi, Human Rights and International Trade (2005). 
Notable exceptions include Garcia, supra note 23; Carmody, Garcia, and Linarelli (eds), supra note 7; 
Linarelli, ‘What Do We Owe Each Other in the Global Economic Order? Constructivist and Contractualist 
Accounts’, 15 J Transnat’l L and Policy (2006) 181; Moellendorf, ‘The World Trade Organization and 
Egalitarian Justice’, 36 Metaphilosophy (2005) 145; F.J. Garcia, Global Justice and International Economic 
Law: Three Takes (2013); Trachtman, ‘Legal Aspects of  a Poverty Agenda at the WTO: Trade Law and 
“Global Apartheid”’, 6 J Int’l Econ L (2003) 3.
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Towards a Political Theory of  International Economic Law 1049
international distributive justice must be derivable, through parallel reasoning, from the 
assumptions that ground strong distributive principles domestically, but those prescrip-
tions must also have something meaningful to say about international economic regula-
tion as a concrete practice in which we are collectively engaged.
Given my focus on distributive justice in economic regulation, one position in the 
global justice debate seems especially promising. This is the Coercion Approach, which 
argues that duties of  distributive justice, understood as a concern for relative rather 
than absolute shares, derive from the nature of  coercion in the domestic context; and 
that the absence of  coercion of  the relevant type explains why such duties are not 
applicable internationally. By linking coercive regulation and economic distribution, 
the Coercion Approach seems best adapted to shed light on the distributive implica-
tions of  the international economic regulation addressed by WTO law. I  therefore 
introduce below one version of  that approach, proposed by Michael Blake, before 
addressing criticisms of  this approach, and considering how it might be adapted to 
address the specific problem of  this article.30
Blake argues that concern for relative shares reflects the need to justify coercion to 
those who are subject to it. He builds his theory from a principle of  autonomy that is 
violated when individuals are subject to coercion. While he does not define coercion, his 
focus is on situations where the options available to individuals are subject to the will 
of  another.31 Recognizing that state coercion, as so understood, is both pervasive and 
necessary, he argues that the violation of  the principle of  autonomy that this implies 
requires justification through the hypothetical consent of  those who are subject to it.
In the domestic context, he emphasizes the continuous nature of  coercion, the uni-
tary nature of  the legal system, and the role of  private law in defining entitlements in 
society, including how citizens may hold, transfer, and enjoy property.32 Egalitarian con-
cerns derive from this role of  the legal system in defining returns to individuals, and from 
the fact that the legal system applies to all individuals within a society. In consequence, 
it must offer to all individuals who are subject to it, including those who do least well, 
reasons to accept it. It is this need to justify the legal system to all, including the least 
advantaged, that generates the difference principle, as the only principle that the least 
advantaged could be expected to accept. Thus, Blake argues, the concern for relative 
shares in domestic theory in fact derives from an underlying concern for autonomy.33
While Blake provides a plausible reconstruction of  Rawls’s argument for the dif-
ference principle domestically, his argument is weaker when he seeks to distinguish 
between international and domestic contexts. At one point, he suggests that:
To insiders, the state says: Yes, we coerce you, but we do so in accordance with principles you 
could not reasonably reject. To outsiders, it says: We do not coerce you, and therefore do not 
apply our principles of  liberal justice to you.34
30 Blake, supra note 15. Further examples of  the Coercion Approach include Valentini, supra note 20; Nagel, 
supra note 8; Risse, ‘What to Say about the State’, 32 Social Theory and Practice 671.
31 Blake, supra note 15, at 268, 270–272.
32 Ibid., at 280–281.
33 Ibid., at 283.
34 Ibid., at 287.
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However, he does not ultimately deny that coercion is present in the international con-
text. Rather, he denies that international coercion is such as to require justification in 
distributive terms, primarily because it is not ongoing or directed against individual 
human agents in the way that domestic coercion is.35 It is only coercion of  this type, 
and particularly coercion tied to the definition of  economic returns to individuals, 
that requires egalitarian justification.
As an argument against strong cosmopolitanism the Coercion Approach has 
faced sustained criticism. In the form advanced by Blake, it is challenged as rely-
ing on a straightforwardly false empirical claim, namely that states do not coerce 
outsiders, or that their coercion is not directed against individuals on an ongoing 
basis.36 In so far as Blake accepts the existence of  international coercion, he fails 
to explain convincingly why domestic coercion is distinctive and gives rise to dis-
tributive obligations.37 Even in its narrowest form, focusing on the role of  domes-
tic coercion in defining economic returns, it is difficult to argue that international 
coercion does not also fulfil this function.38 More generally, it has been suggested 
that the Coercion Approach depends not on coercion, in the narrow sense, but on 
a broader concern for ‘the non-voluntary, de facto authority of  a legal system’,39 
or the non-voluntary ‘imposition of  societal rules’.40 This reading makes it even 
harder to distinguish the international and domestic contexts in a convincing way, 
leading Sangiovanni to characterize the ‘voluntarist’ turn in global justice theory 
as a dead end.41
There are, however, good reasons to maintain the focus on coercion, understood 
broadly as subjection to non-voluntary institutions. The imposition on persons of  
non-voluntary institutions and the effects those institutions have are essential in 
motivating Rawls’s account of  domestic justice.42 Blake is right in arguing that it is in 
large part because the institutions of  the basic structure are non-voluntary that we 
must rely on the hypothetical consent of  persons, as modelled in the original position, 
to identify appropriate principles of  justice.43 Indeed, in the domestic context it has 
been argued that the justification of  coercion, so understood, is the central problem 
35 Ibid., at 280–281. Blake does note in a footnote that ‘the entire international system might be based on 
coercion’, but does not pursue this point except to suggest that the justification offered for that coercion 
would differ from the justification offered by a state to its own citizen.
36 Abizadeh, ‘Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (Not Site) of  Distributive Justice’, 
35 Phil & Public Affairs (2007) 318, at 350–351.
37 Ibid., at 354–356.
38 Ibid., at 355–356.
39 Sangiovanni, supra note 15, at 12–14.
40 Ibid., at 15. The breadth of  Valentini’s definition of  coercion arguably reflects a similar move.
41 Ibid., at 19. I  do not take up here an alternative challenge that Sangiovanni makes to the Coercion 
Approach’s underlying logical form: Sangiovanni, ‘The Irrelevance of  Coercion, Imposition, and 
Framing to Distributive Justice’, 40 Phil & Public Affairs (2012) 79. I have elsewhere suggested a prelimi-
nary response to that challenge in my unpublished conference paper, ‘Coercion and Cooperation: Towards a 
Mixed Theory of  Equality in Global Commerce’, presented at Brave New World 2013, Manchester Centre 
for Political Theory, 27 June 2013.
42 Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, 77 J Philosophy (1980) 515, at 517.
43 J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), at 10, 20, 40–41, 55.
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Towards a Political Theory of  International Economic Law 1051
of  contemporary liberalism.44 Thus, before abandoning the Coercion Approach, we 
might look to reconstruct it in ways that avoid the problems noted above. Given that 
the main weakness of  the Coercion Approach is its failure plausibly to identify how 
international and domestic coercion differ, and how this difference explains the dif-
ferent distributive obligations that apply internationally and domestically, it is here 
that we should start in seeking to reconstruct this approach. That is the task of  the 
following sections.
3 The Coercion Approach and the Plurality of  Global 
Institutions
Drawing on Rawls’s discussion of  the basic structure, we might first recast the Coercion 
Approach as focusing on non-voluntary subjection to institutions that distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of  advantages from social 
cooperation.45 As well as tying the argument to a canonical account of  contemporary 
liberalism, this formulation captures Blake’s central concern with cases where the 
options open to individuals are shaped by the will of  another. Its focus on institutions 
reflects Rawls’s own starting point, which is shared by coercion theorists;46 but by 
emphasizing subjection rather than participation it avoids the status quo bias criticism 
levelled at some institutional theories.47 A person or people is subject to an institution 
whenever that institution shapes its fundamental rights and duties or determines the 
division of  advantages from cooperation in which it participates. As a definition of  
coercion, this might be criticized for under-emphasizing effects on the coercee’s will, 
which constitutes coercion as a violation of  autonomy. However, on closer examina-
tion we generally find such non-voluntary institutions supported by coercion in this 
narrower sense.48 Further, notwithstanding Blake’s argument, the link to autonomy 
is not essential to a Rawlsian approach, which asks not ‘how can coercion of  the will 
be justified given the principle of  autonomy?’, but rather, ‘how can coercion through 
non-voluntary institutions be reconciled with the respect due to individuals as free 
and equal moral persons?’.49
Coercion, so understood, is obviously not limited to the domestic context. 
International examples include territorial sovereignty,50 structural competition,51 
44 Gaus, ‘Coercion, Ownership and the Redistributive State: Justificatory Liberalism’s Classical Tilt’, 27 
Social Philosophy and Policy (2010) 233.
45 J. Rawls, A Theory of  Justice (1972), at 7; Rawls, supra note 10, at 258.
46 Although for a non-institutional coercion-based approach see Julius, ‘Basic Structure and the Value of  
Equality’, 31 Phil & Public Affairs (2003) 321; Julius, ‘Nagel’s Atlas’, 34 Phil & Public Affairs (2006) 176.
47 Valentini, ‘Global Justice and Practice-Dependence: Conventionalism, Institutionalism, Functionalism’, 
19 J Political Philosophy (2011) 399.
48 Rawls, supra note 43, at 40.
49 On the move from autonomy to respect and its implications see Nussbaum, ‘Perfectionist Liberalism and 
Political Liberalism’, 39 Phil & Public Affairs (2011) 3.
50 C. Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of  the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in 
International Relations (1999).
51 K.N. Waltz, Theory of  International Politics (1979).
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border controls,52 the internal laws of  other states,53 the global market economy,54 and 
the system of  international law and treaty institutions.55 Further, these are not simply 
a function of  non-ideal conditions or indeed political choices; as this list illustrates, 
even under ideal conditions the international order is necessarily coercive.
However, the mere fact that the international system is coercive need not evoke egal-
itarian justification. Recall Blake’s starting point: coercion must be justified in terms 
that those subject to it can reasonably accept. For Rawls, this is the function of  delib-
eration in the original position, which seeks to model fair agreement amongst partici-
pants conceived as free and equal moral persons.56 In the domestic context, the first 
subject of  justice is the society’s basic structure; and amongst free and equal persons 
symmetrically situated subject to that structure, the difference principle is selected 
as the only basis on which it can be justified to all. Rawls’s egalitarianism is thus a 
consequence of  his approach to justifying domestic institutions. Once we move to the 
international context, however, the situation becomes more complicated. Agents are 
no longer symmetrically situated; rather, we must consider the different positions of  
insiders and outsiders, each of  whom is subject to institutions in different ways. To the 
extent that they are subject to institutions, those institutions must be justified to them. 
But the form of  justification may vary across persons.
Domestically, we start from the basic structure, understood as ‘the way in which 
the major social institutions fit together into one system, and how they assign funda-
mental rights and duties and shape the division of  advantages and disadvantages that 
arises from social cooperation’.57 As the basic structure is responsible for the distribu-
tion of  advantages and disadvantages, we can assess its justice in terms of  distribu-
tive outcomes. In the international context, however, while there are institutions that 
assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of  advantages and disad-
vantages from social cooperation, these do not fit together in the way that Rawls envis-
ages the basic structure and Blake the legal system. Rather than a unified scheme, we 
find a plurality of  institutions, which together have pervasive effects on agents’ life 
prospects, but each of  which may alone have only limited power to affect outcomes. 
Distribution is effected by a range of  different and largely uncoordinated institutions, 
some domestic, some international, and not subject to any common political author-
ity.58 Therefore, rather than asking whether the coercion of  the system as a whole 
can be justified, as we do domestically, we must approach each institution separately, 
while always recognizing that whether one institution can be justified will necessarily 
depend on its interaction with others. Further, as no institution is wholly responsible 
52 Abizadeh, ‘Democratic Theory and Border Coercion’, 36 Political Theory (2008) 37; Miller, ‘Why 
Immigration Controls Are Not Coercive: A Reply to Arash Abizadeh’, 38 Political Theory (2010) 111.
53 D.W. Drezner, All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (2007); Freeman, supra 
note 15, at 306–308.
54 Inayatullah and Blaney, ‘Realizing Sovereignty’, 21 Rev Int’l Studies (1995) 3.
55 Buchanan, supra note 20; Maffettone, ‘The WTO and the Limits of  Distributive Justice’, 35 Phil & Social 
Criticism (2009) 243.
56 Rawls, supra note 43, at 6. Cf. Rawls, supra note 42, at 528.
57 Rawls, supra note 10, at 258.
58 Freeman, supra note 15, at 287–288.
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for the distributive outcomes of  persons or peoples, its justification cannot depend 
solely on those outcomes; although it may depend on how it affects them.59
In the international economy, the most important institutions for these purposes 
are the 200 sovereign states whose actions, individual and collective, constitute the 
framework within which economic life proceeds.60 International institutions in the 
conventional sense, including in particular the WTO, undoubtedly play an important 
role; but they do so primarily through coordinating the regulatory choices of  states. 
It is only by first justifying the state that we can hope in turn to justify broader inter-
national economic institutions. It is therefore on state measures that I concentrate in 
this article. However, when we consider the state as an institution of  the international 
economy, we must consider it from the perspective of  both insiders and outsiders, each 
of  whom is subject to it, albeit in a different way.
To whom must these disparate institutions be justified? In the final analysis, they 
must be justifiable to those subject to them, persons and peoples as they are, in the 
world as it is; but in the first instance we consider their justification to idealized per-
sons and peoples, modelled as free and equal, rational and reasonable. The purpose 
of  this abstraction is to help to identify the reasons that apply to persons and peoples 
as they in fact are, the justifications they have reason to accept, and the ends they 
have reason to share.61 I draw my conceptions of  persons and peoples from Rawls’s 
construction of  the original position in domestic and international theory.62 As moral 
persons, persons have two higher order interests, represented by their capacity for an 
effective sense of  justice and their capacity to form, revise, and rationally pursue a 
conception of  the good.63 Peoples’ interests are similarly modelled save that liberal 
peoples, lacking a comprehensive conception of  the good, substitute their reason-
able conception of  political justice, as identified in the domestic original position.64 As 
rational, they seek to advance these higher order interests, which leads to their valu-
ing basic liberties (at the level of  persons), self-determination (at the level of  peoples), 
and social primary goods, as the all purpose means to advance their conceptions of  
59 Ibid., at 308; Meckled-Garcia, ‘On the Very Idea of  Cosmopolitan Justice: Constructivism and International 
Agency’, 16 J Political Philosophy (2008) 245.
60 Freeman, supra note 15, at 306–308.
61 Rawls, supra note 42, at 516–517.
62 Rawls, supra note 15, at 30–35; Rawls, supra note 43, at 80–89; Rawls, supra note 42, at 522–554. Rawls 
himself  does not transpose the concept of  the person as free and equal from domestic to international the-
ory, a move that has been heavily criticized: K.C. Tan, Toleration, Diversity, and Global Justice (2000). This 
reflects Rawls’s commitment to a theory that is political not metaphysical, and a view that the concept 
of  the person as free and equal is not shared by non-liberal peoples, and specifically by Rawls’s ‘decent 
hierarchical societies’. My rejection of  this move can be justified on any of  three bases: first, that in so far 
as one can describe an internationally shared public reason, it necessarily includes the myriad human 
rights treaties that themselves express this concept of  the person; secondly, that regardless of  whether 
non-liberal peoples share this concept of  the person, a theory of  justice for liberal peoples cannot deny it; 
and thirdly, that the attraction of  political liberalism as an account of  justice is limited to contexts where 
this concept of  the person is shared, and to the extent that it is not liberals must instead ground their 
judgements in comprehensive liberal world views.
63 Rawls, supra note 42, at 525.
64 Rawls, supra note 15, at 34.
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justice and of  the good.65 As reasonable, they recognize the equal status of  others, and 
are prepared to cooperate on fair terms provided others do likewise.66 Rawls relies on 
the veil of  ignorance, symmetry of  persons, and the focus on the basic structure to 
build reasonableness into the original position; persons are modelled as rational while 
their situation enforces reasonableness.67 However, given the move, noted above, away 
from symmetry and the unified basic structure, I cannot rely solely on structural con-
straints to model reasonableness, and must instead make it a more explicit element in 
the justification of  principles. What does this require? While Rawls does not generally 
define reasonableness,68 it implies at least the following: recognition of  the equality 
of  persons/peoples and willingness to cooperate on fair terms;69 acceptance of  the 
principle of  fair reciprocity, ‘that all who cooperate should share in the benefits and 
burdens of  cooperation in some appropriate fashion as judged by a suitable bench-
mark’;70 acceptance of  the burdens of  judgment; and acceptance of  generality and 
universality as formal constraints on the concept of  right.71 Where the concept of  rea-
sonableness appears below it is used in this minimal sense. Our idealized persons and 
peoples are not therefore wholly egoistic. Rather, they have ends deriving from their 
conception of  justice and their status as reasonable that give them reason to accept, 
under appropriate circumstances, justifications deriving from the interests of  others 
with whom they are linked through unavoidable coercive institutions.72
What form do those justifications take? The next three sections develop the justi-
ficatory framework sketched above into a typology of  international coercion and its 
justification. Section 7 draws these together to derive the principles of  justice in inter-
national economic regulation identified above.
4 Direct Coercion, Moral Equality, and Self  Determination
We first distinguish between being directly subject to an institution, such that the 
institution directly involves a person or makes them an intentional focus of  its action; 
and being indirectly subject to an institution, such that the institution, while affecting 
the rights, duties, obligations, or opportunities of  a person or determining the division 
of  advantages from cooperation in which they participate, does not directly involve 
them or make them an intentional focus of  its action.
This reflects the distinction between intending and foreseeing that grounds the 
doctrine of  double effect (DDE). DDE is a controversial principle;73 but I argue in this 
65 Ibid., at 39–45; Rawls, supra note 42, at 526–528.
66 Rawls, supra note 43, at 6–7.
67 Rawls, supra note 42, at 528.
68 Rawls, supra note 43, at 82.
69 Ibid., at 6–7.
70 Rawls, supra note 42, at 528.
71 Rawls, supra note 45, at 130–133; Rawls, supra note 43, at 85–86.
72 Rawls, supra note 42, at 530, 532.
73 For critical evaluations from deontological and consequentialist perspectives see McIntyre, ‘Doing Away 
with Double Effect’, 111 Ethics (2001) 219; J.F. Bennett, The Act Itself (1995), at 194–225. For a defence 
of  the slightly reformulated doctrine on which I rely see Quinn, ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: 
The Doctrine of  Double Effect’, 18 Phil & Public Affairs (1989) 334.
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section that its underlying rationale is relevant to the justification of  international 
coercion, and that its relevance here is not limited to those who accept the principle in 
its conventional form.
DDE claims that the difference between foresight and intention may mean the dif-
ference between an action that is permitted and one that is prohibited. Specifically, as 
articulated by Warren Quinn:
[DDE] distinguishes between agency in which [foreseeable] harm comes to some victims, at 
least in part, from the agent’s deliberately involving them in something in order to further his 
purpose precisely by way of  their being so involved (agency in which they figure as intentional 
objects) and harmful agency in which either nothing is in that way intended for the victims or 
what is so intended does not contribute to their harm.74
Agency of  the first kind is viewed as particularly troubling; and the fact that the vic-
tim is an object of  the agent’s intention (‘the agent’s deliberately involving him’), and 
that the agent pursues its objective by a causal chain that runs through the victim (‘in 
order to further his purpose precisely by way of  their being so involved’) explains this. 
But why is harmful agency of  this type (which Quinn terms Direct Agency) particu-
larly troubling? Quinn offers two arguments:
First, he suggests, Direct Agency shows ‘a shocking failure of  respect for the persons 
who are harmed’.75 There is undoubtedly also a lack of  respect in cases of  Indirect 
Agency, where individuals are harmed as a side effect rather than as a means; but the 
disrespect in cases of  Direct Agency is greater, because it involves the agent taking up 
a particular attitude towards his victims: ‘[h]e must treat them as if  they were then 
and there for his purposes’. By contrast, where victims are harmed as a side effect, they 
‘are not viewed strategically at all and therefore not treated as for the agent’s purposes 
rather than their own’.76 Ideally, we should treat individuals not as mere means to an 
end but as ends in themselves. Indirect Agency, in so far as it harms individuals inci-
dentally on the way to achieving some goal, does not treat them as ends and is to that 
extent objectionable; but at least Indirect Agency does not treat individuals as means, 
which is regarded as worse than bracketing their interests entirely.
Secondly, Quinn argues that the doctrine:
reflects a Kantian ideal of  human community and interaction. Each person is treated, so far 
as possible, as existing only for purposes that he can share. … People have a strong prima 
facie right not to be sacrificed in strategic roles over which they have no say. They have a right 
not to be pressed, in apparent violation of  their prior rights, into the service of  other people’s 
purposes.77
The claim is thus that (i) persons should be treated as ends, not means, and to 
treat a person as a means is more objectionable even than discounting them 
entirely in pursuit of  a goal; and (ii) persons should be treated as existing for 
purposes in which they can share, so that making use of  a person instrumentally 
74 Ibid., at 343.
75 Ibid., at 348.
76 Ibid.
77 Bennett, supra note 73, at 350–351.
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for some collateral purpose is more objectionable than simply discounting that 
person’s interests in pursuit of  that same purpose.78 As Kagan notes, in cases of  
Direct Agency ‘I am using [a] person – and it might plausibly be claimed that [he] 
is not mine to use’.79
This idea that persons should not be used to serve the ends of  others features 
prominently in liberal thinking on justice from Kant through Rawls to contempo-
rary theorists. In Kant, it is reflected in the claim that persons should be treated 
not as means only, but as ends in themselves. Thus, discussing contract, an arche-
typal case of  instrumental use by one of  another, Kant argues that the contract 
right must derive from the will of  the promisor. My deed is quintessentially my 
own, so that the right of  another to its use must derive from me, and indirectly 
from my own ends. In claiming rights under contract, a promisee does not reduce 
the promisor to an instrument of  his will; rather, he enforces their joint will, and 
their shared end, as expressed in their prior agreement. A  right to make use of  
another that does not derive ultimately from them is incompatible with respect for 
their freedom.80
A similar concern motivates Rawls’s account of  socio-economic inequalities in 
domestic justice; but hypothetical consent replaces the prior act of  will in linking the 
use of  another to ends they have reason to share. The symmetrical situation of  per-
sons in the original position reflects the way each is directly subject to the institu-
tions of  the basic structure; as such, reflecting Quinn’s argument, each must be able 
to share in the ends for which they are so subject, a requirement that for Rawls implies 
the difference principle.81 This may seem difficult to reconcile with our daily practice, 
as citizens and market participants, of  making use of  our fellow citizens to meet our 
needs without asking them to share our ends, just as we similarly are used by them. 
However, for Rawls the liberal basic structure itself  does not pursue any end except the 
freedom of  those subject to it; and the difference principle, by maximizing the position 
of  the least advantaged, ensures that the basic structure can be justified to each as 
advancing their freedom to pursue their own ends to the greatest extent compatible 
with the like freedom of  others.82 Thus, while as persons we may turn others to our 
own purposes, their use is ultimately referable to a coercive structure that serves ends 
78 My categorization of  Quinn’s arguments reflects the treatment in ibid., at 220–221.
79 S. Kagan, The Limits of  Morality (1989), at 132. This recalls, in the distributive justice context, Nozick’s 
challenge as to whether social product is really society’s to distribute: R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 
(1974), at 199.
80 I. Kant, Practical Philosophy (1996), at 421–426. Kant’s concern to reconcile the rights we have over one 
another with the freedom of  each to define our own ends is also reflected in his discussion of  ‘Rights to 
Persons akin to Rights to Things’: ibid., at 426–432. For commentary on this point see Rauscher, ‘Kant’s 
Social and Political Philosophy’, in Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy (2012), available at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/kant-social-political/.
81 Indeed, Rawls explicitly links the difference principle to Kant’s injunction to treat persons as ends not 
means: Rawls, supra note 45, at 180. See also and more generally Rawls, supra note 42.
82 The relationship between the way persons within a society may seem to treat one another as means only 
and the way the basic structure treats each as ends is reflected further in Rawls’s discussion of  back-
ground fairness: Rawls, supra note 10, at 265–271.
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that are their own; and it is that structure, rather than our individual projects, that we 
are concerned to justify.83
The direct coercion of  persons thus plays an important role in explaining the prin-
ciples of  justice within the state. However, while persons are necessarily directly 
subject to the basic structure of  domestic societies, internationally much coercion is 
indirect. Outsiders may be affected by a people’s institutions, but these impact on them 
as side effects rather than as means to the desired ends, and so may be justifiable even 
where the relevant end is not one that those affected have reason to share. This does 
not mean that such coercion does not require justification, but only that it may be in 
different terms. In particular, the principle of  self-determination provides a basis for 
justifying much indirect international coercion.
Self-determination itself  may be justified on various grounds:84 Miller defends it as 
a means of  enforcing social justice, protecting a national culture, and expressing indi-
viduals’ interest in collective autonomy;85 Beitz interprets arguments for self-determi-
nation as grounded in domestic social justice;86 while for Rawls, self-determination 
expresses a fundamental interest of  peoples ‘to preserve their free political institutions 
and liberties and free culture of  their civil society’.87 Howsoever justified, in its con-
ventional form self-determination asserts that communities are entitled to a sphere 
of  autonomy, invoking ‘the right of  individuals to a public sphere, thus implying that 
individuals are entitled to establish institutions and manage their communal life in 
ways that reflect their communal values, traditions and history’.88 It asserts that there 
is a sphere of  communal activity that is uniquely the concern of  the relevant commu-
nity, within which the community is entitled to govern its own affairs with minimal 
reference to outsiders. Further, in its liberal form it asserts that all persons have an 
interest in self-determination.
This sphere of  autonomy provides a basis for justifying indirect coercion that has 
no analogue in the domestic context.89 Where a community acts to regulate its own 
affairs, this may indirectly affect the rights and duties of  outsiders, or shape the dis-
tribution of  benefits from transnational cooperation involving them. Indeed, in the 
context of  economic interaction, such indirect coercion is almost inevitable. If  self-
determination is an end that all have reason to share then respect for a community’s 
right to self-determination provides a basis for outsiders to accept the indirect coercion 
83 Julius uses the similar concept of  ‘framing’, understood as acting with the intention of  leading another to 
act in a way that advances one’s interests, to reconstruct Rawls’ argument domestically, and to suggest a 
‘sliding scale’ approach globally: Julius, ‘Basic Structure’, supra note 46, at 328; Julius, ‘Nagel’s Atlas’,at 
190–192.
84 A. Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of  International Society (2007), at 27–29.
85 Miller, supra note 14, at ch. 4.
86 Beitz, supra note 13, at 92–109.
87 Rawls, supra note 15, at 29, 35, 111.
88 Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (1993), at 69.
89 A parallel is sometimes drawn between national self-determination and individual freedom. However, 
whereas persons can be regarded as constituting self-validating ends for themselves, not subject to exter-
nal justification, the same cannot plausibly be claimed for collective institutions. While self-determina-
tion provides a ground for justifying institutions, freedom pre-empts the need for such justification with 
respect to the ends persons choose for themselves.
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that flows from it. Such indirect coercion does not ‘use’ outsiders, in the problematic 
sense identified by Quinn; and so provided the underlying principle of  self-determina-
tion is justified, those outsiders cannot argue that they are being made to serve ends 
that are not their own.
However, this justification cannot be extended to direct coercion. Self-determination 
asserts a right to self-government. It does not express any claim to govern others, 
and to the extent that a community purports to do so, respect for the moral equality 
of  outsiders requires that their coercion be justified by reference to ends they have 
reason to share. Self-determination may be relevant to such justification where the 
direct coercion is specifically intended to protect that end; but in that case, the struc-
ture of  the justification is different from that invoked in the case of  indirect coercion. 
Rather than arguing that self-determination provides a basis for indirectly coercing 
outsiders in pursuit of  ends that are not their own, it claims that self-determination 
is an end that all have reason to share, providing a justification for the specific direct 
coercion.
The distinction is that between respecting another people’s right to pursue a par-
ticular end and having reason to pursue that end oneself. If  all peoples have reason 
to value self-determination, then we can justify direct coercion that pursues that end. 
But the ends that self-determining peoples in turn pursue are their own, and need not 
be shared by others. Others have reason to respect those ends, as a consequence of  
their valuing self-determination, and this provides a basis for justifying the resulting 
indirect coercion; but they have no reason themselves to share those ends, and so can-
not be directly coerced in pursuit of them.
The upshot is that, internationally, indirect coercion may be justifiable in cir-
cumstances where direct coercion is not, even though the actual effects of  indirect 
coercion are the same as those of  direct coercion. In particular, indirect coercion 
may be justified by invoking the principle of  self-determination, provided that prin-
ciple is itself  justified, and provided the negative effects of  the indirect coercion are 
not such as to outweigh it.90 Direct coercion, on the other hand, must be justified 
to those who are subject to it by reference to ends that they themselves have reason 
to share.
5 Inclusive Coercion and the Fruits of  Social Cooperation
We next distinguish exclusive coercion, whose effect is to exclude those subject to it 
from participation in some productive cooperative practice, from inclusive coercion, 
which governs participation in such a practice and the distribution of  the benefits 
therefrom.
90 As with the classical doctrine of  double effect, it is not suggested that indirect agency will always be jus-
tifiable. The negative effects of  indirect agency may be such that it cannot be justified. The claim is only 
that it can be more easily justified, and by a different route, than direct agency. As discussed further below, 
self-determination cannot justify coercion the effect of  which is to prevent outsiders from themselves 
enjoying self-determination or living minimally decent lives. It is an open question how far this limits 
states in the world as it is.
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To show the significance of  this distinction, it is necessary to rehearse briefly Rawls’s 
treatment of  distributive justice in the domestic context. Rawls characterizes the prob-
lem of  distributive justice thus:
The problem of  distributive justice in justice as fairness is always this: how are the institu-
tions of  the basic structure to be regulated as one unified scheme of  institutions so that a fair, 
efficient and productive system of  social cooperation can be maintained over time, from one 
generation to the next? Contrast this with the very different problem of  how a given bundle 
of  commodities is to be distributed, or allocated among various individuals whose particular 
needs, desires, and preferences are known to us, and who have not cooperated in any way to 
produce these commodities.91
Justice as fairness is fundamentally a theory of  how the benefits of  productive coop-
eration should be distributed amongst participants by the non-voluntary institutions 
that govern it. The difference principle is proposed as a basis on which we can justify 
that coercion to all participants.
In so far as society constitutes a scheme of  cooperation, and that cooperation gives 
rise to benefits that would not otherwise exist, there is a need for some principle of  dis-
tribution.92 The selection of  equality as a baseline reflects the equal status of  persons, 
and the absence of  any respectable alternative distributive principle. Rawls’s argu-
ments against alternative candidate principles do not require repetition here; suffice 
it to note that the parties in the original position are expected to reject any departure 
from equality unless it is to the benefit of  the least-advantaged member of  society.
In developing his argument, Rawls rejects distribution based on the contributions 
that individuals make, or based on their natural talents. In part, talents are rejected 
because they are regarded as ‘morally arbitrary’. However, both contribution and 
talents are also rejected because they are regarded as in a more concrete sense irrel-
evant to the distribution of  the benefits of  cooperation. Rawls does not deny that 
individuals are entitled to their natural talents, and to the benefits that flow from 
them.93 The benefits of  social cooperation, however, flow not from the natural talents 
of  any individual, but rather from cooperation between them.94 They are a function 
of  ‘complementarities between talents’, both in degree and kind, which make pos-
sible benefits that simply are not available to individuals. It is for this reason that we 
cannot regard any individual as having a prior claim on those benefits, and so can-
not justify their distribution except on a basis that starts from equality, reflecting the 
moral equality of  the participants.95
It has been suggested that international economic activity does not constitute 
cooperation of  this kind, being better regarded as mere ‘exchange’.96 This position 
91 Rawls, supra note 43, at 50.
92 Rawls, supra note 45, at 62.
93 In this he does not invoke the luck egalitarian argument against natural talents, a point elided in Beitz’s 
argument for the moral arbitrariness of  natural resources: Beitz, supra note 13, at 138.
94 Rawls, supra note 45, at 101.
95 It is this claim that Nozick rejects when he argues that it is not for society to distribute goods that are in 
fact produced by individuals.
96 Barry, ‘Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective’, in J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds), Nomos 
XXIV: Ethics, Economics and the Law (1982), 219 at 232–233.
 at R
oyal H
allam
shire H
ospital on M
arch 18, 2015
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
1060 EJIL 25 (2014), 1043–1070
is difficult to sustain, however, once we recall that international trade, rather than 
simply representing the exchange of  products and services between communities, 
facilitates the production of  goods and services that would not be produced in its 
absence. We do not need to invoke the mutual dependencies of  transnational pro-
duction under globalization. The simplest two-product equilibrium models show 
the increase in overall output that results when peoples with different compara-
tive advantages trade;97 this is one of  the few uncontested claims in international 
economics. Like domestic cooperation, this trade dividend is a product of  the dif-
ferences between the parties involved; no people could have achieved it without 
the cooperation of  others. There may be differences between cooperation in the 
international economy and domestic cooperation, both in the intensity of  interac-
tions and the nature of  the goods produced;98 but it still raises the fundamental 
problem of  justifying the distribution of  social goods that would not exist without 
cooperation.99
Furthermore, it is institutions, rather than some pre-institutional entitlement, 
that determine how the benefits of  cooperation are distributed. This is the essence of  
Rawls’s anti-libertarian argument, and applies equally in international and domestic 
contexts. If  we accept that different institutions would result in different distributions, 
then the mere fact that a particular distribution emerges under one system provides 
no basis for those so benefited to object to an alternative system under which they 
receive less. Entitlement arises only within an institutional system, and is a function 
of  that system. This is why the justification of  inclusive institutions is intimately con-
nected to their distributive effects.100
It is the fact of  productive cooperation that creates the need for a distributive prin-
ciple; and the claim that benefits accrue from the differences between participants, 
rather than the participants’ own resources, makes equality the appropriate baseline. 
However, the logic of  this argument need not extend to non-participants. It is because 
participants make a contribution that they have a claim on the resulting social prod-
uct, which must be reflected in the justification of  the institutions that govern it. We 
97 Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz, supra note 3, at 64–65; D.  Ray, Development Economics (1998), at 
647–650.
98 This is the central argument advanced in Sangiovanni, supra note 15.
99 We find little recognition of  this problem in Rawls’ own work. While he rejects egalitarian principles 
of  international distributive justice he makes little effort to put anything in their place. This reflects his 
assumption that most, if  not all, significant social cooperation takes place within, rather than between, 
peoples: Rawls, supra note 15, at 39.
100 Rawls’ view that distributive justice is about how institutions distribute goods amongst participants, 
rather than the transfer of  resources from one party to another, is difficult to reconcile with his argu-
ments against international distributive justice. Those arguments seem more concerned with allocative 
than distributive justice, although this may simply reflect the positions against which he is arguing: ibid., 
at 113–120. Pogge argues convincingly that Rawls, in so far as he adopts a distributive principle inter-
nationally, has implicitly endorsed the libertarian principle of  entitlement: Pogge, ‘An Egalitarian Law of  
Peoples’, 23 Phil & Public Affairs (1994) 195, at 211–214. While Freeman challenges this view it is dif-
ficult to find textual support for any other principle, although some of  Rawls’s references to free trade can 
be read as endorsing an unstated moderate egalitarianism: Freeman, supra note 15, at 285–286, 310; 
Rawls, supra note 15, at 42–43.
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cannot distinguish between the claims that various participants have on the benefits of  
their cooperation; but we can distinguish their claims from those of  non-participants.
The justification of  exclusion, therefore, need not refer to the benefits accruing to 
participants. Indeed, given the basis of  participants’ claims it would be surprising if  
outsiders could make similar demands. In particular, the mere fact that if  they were 
admitted outsiders would be entitled to make distributive claims does not mean that 
their exclusion can only be justified in distributive terms. We may accept that whether 
someone is included or excluded is morally arbitrary; but in so far as distributive 
claims depend on participation and contribution, the mere fact of  moral arbitrariness 
is insufficient to require egalitarian justification.101 Exclusive coercion must be justi-
fied, but its justification need not mirror the justification of  inclusive coercion.
What constraints apply to the justification of  exclusive coercion? Like all coercion, 
it must be justified in terms that those subject to it can reasonably accept. Further, 
having regard to the moral equality of  peoples and persons, the justification must 
accord with the principles of  generality and reciprocity; in so far as it invokes the value 
of  some end for one party, it must acknowledge its equal value for others.102 Finally, 
building on the discussion in the previous section, in so far as it is direct, it must be 
justified in terms of  ends those subject to it have reason to share.
What does exclusive coercion look like in the international context? Without pre-
judging whether it may also be inclusive, the most obvious example is border coercion, 
and specifically restrictive immigration policies.103 Refusing a migrant entry excludes 
them from the scheme of  productive social cooperation within a state; further, it may 
significantly restrict their opportunities and leave them significantly less advantaged 
than participants who benefit from that scheme. In short, the effect of  this coercion is 
often significantly anti-egalitarian.
However, this does not mean that the coercion cannot be justified in terms that the 
frustrated migrant can reasonably accept. As with the direct/indirect distinction, the 
principle of  self-determination is relevant here. If  we assume that persons and peoples 
value self-determination, and recognize its equal value for others, then this can provide 
a justification for border controls that migrants can reasonably accept.104 However, it 
will not suffice in all cases. Where, for example, the effect of  exclusive coercion is to 
prevent the frustrated migrant living a minimally decent life, the excluding people’s 
interest in self-determination cannot provide a sufficient justification. Similarly, if  the 
effect of  exclusive coercion is to prevent another people from itself  enjoying self-deter-
mination (for example, because it is prevented from accessing essential resources) then 
it would be unreasonable for the excluding people to justify its coercion on this basis.
101 On the limits of  the moral arbitrariness argument see Sangiovanni, ‘Global Justice and the Moral 
Arbitrariness of  Birth’, 94 Monist (2011) 571.
102 On generality see Rawls, supra note 45, at 130–132. On reciprocity see Rawls, supra note 10, at xliv–xlix, 
16; Rawls, supra note 43, at 6–7; Rawls, supra note 42, at 528–530.
103 On the coercive nature of  border controls see Abizadeh, supra note 52; Miller, supra note 52.
104 That some border control is necessary to facilitate self-determination is accepted by most theorists who 
see it as a value: Miller, supra note 14, at 128–130; Rawls, supra note 15, at 8–9, 38–39; Walzer, supra 
note 14, at 42–63.
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What is important about these justifications, and their limits, is that they are suffi-
cientarian rather than egalitarian. There are, we may assume, minimum prerequisites 
for a person or people to enjoy the good of  self-determination. If  a person lacks basic 
resources or is subject to gross human rights violations, they cannot enjoy self-deter-
mination. Similarly, if  a people lacks the resources to organize itself  internally and to 
provide for the basic needs of  its members, it cannot be said to enjoy self-determina-
tion. To the extent that exclusive coercion leaves persons or peoples in these circum-
stances, it cannot be justified by reference to self-determination.105 However, above 
these minimum thresholds it is irrelevant that the excluding people is significantly 
more prosperous than the migrant’s home community.106 Their exclusion is justified 
by an end that both enjoy and both have reason to share. Notwithstanding the adverse 
distributive consequences, the frustrated migrant can reasonably accept this justifica-
tion, even if  it leaves him worse off  than he might otherwise be, and than those who 
are excluding him already are.
6 External Coercion and the Interpersonal Test
A final aspect of  international coercion that is relevant to its justification is the iden-
tity of  the authors of  that coercion, and those on whose behalf  it is adopted.
The ideal liberal state can be understood as one wherein individuals become the authors 
of  their own coercion. The justificatory apparatus of  the original position models individu-
als’ choices in respect of  matters that they cannot in fact choose, with a view to reconcil-
ing the non-voluntary institutions to which they are subject with their status as free and 
equal. For the same reason democracy and political rights are valued as giving persons a 
stake in their political institutions. At each level, we assume that such self-authored coer-
cion can be more readily reconciled with equal respect than coercion whose subjects have 
no stake therein. We thus have reason to be more concerned about coercion by others 
than we have about coercion in which the subject is also in some sense the author.
There may be some aspects of  international coercion that can properly be regarded 
as self-authored in this sense, but in most cases we are concerned with coercion exer-
cised by one political community against members of  another.107 A useful device for 
capturing this concern is Cohen’s interpersonal test:
This tests how robust a policy argument is by subjecting it to variation with respect to who 
is speaking and/or who is listening when the argument is presented. The test asks whether 
105 This point may be limited to circumstances of  moderate scarcity. Under absolute scarcity, where resources 
are insufficient for all peoples to be well ordered, it may be that the self-determination justification would 
apply, provided the excluding people took all possible steps to vindicate the rights of  those excluded, hav-
ing regard to their own limited resources.
106 I have assumed for the purposes of  this article that the relevant minimum is that at which Rawls locates 
the duty of  assistance. For a different view see Tasioulas, ‘Global Justice Without End?’, 36 Metaphilosophy 
(2005) 3. Regardless of  the exact threshold, the key point is that it is an absolute, rather than relative, 
standard.
107 Valentini’s concept of  interactional coercion goes some way to capturing this idea: Valentini, supra note 
20, at 130.
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the argument could serve as a justification of  a mooted policy when uttered by any member 
of  a society to any other member. … If, because of  who is presenting it, and/or to whom it is 
presented, the argument cannot serve as a justification of  the policy, then whether or not it 
passes as such under other dialogical conditions, it fails (tout court) to provide a comprehensive 
justification of  the policy.108
Cohen proposes the test as a general constraint, but it has particular relevance in 
the international context, where we are significantly concerned with coercion of  the 
members of  one community by another. In these circumstances, the interpersonal 
test prompts us to consider not only whether that coercion can be justified in terms 
that the subjects could reasonably be expected to accept; but also whether they could 
reasonably be expected to accept the proposed justification when advanced by the 
authors of  that coercion.
In what circumstances might a justification fail the interpersonal test? Cohen 
highlights cases where a justification invokes a factual premise for which the 
speaker is responsible, and the speaker cannot in turn justify their making that 
premise true. Consider, for example, the political economy arguments commonly 
invoked to justify safeguards; it is claimed that, in their absence, greater protection-
ist pressures would result in even more restricted market access.109 To the extent 
that this is true, it provides good reason for outsiders to accept such measures. 
However, if  we consider this argument as articulated by the protectionist state, we 
recognize the factual premise (i.e., the risk of  protectionism) as attributable to the 
people making the argument, in so far as it is its own citizens who pose this risk, 
and it is not obviously justified in making this premise true. It may constitute a 
good argument for accepting safeguards, but it cannot constitute a justification for 
imposing them.
A second way a justification may fail the interpersonal test is where, while a mea-
sure is desirable in itself, its author is not the appropriate person to adopt it. Again, 
the principle of  self-determination is relevant. In its standard form, that principle 
would in most cases preclude a measure adopted by one people from being justi-
fied by the benefits it confers on another, not because the effects of  the measure are 
objectionable, but because of  the relative positions of  those adopting and accepting 
it. For example, the threat by a more developed people to restrict market access for 
less developed peoples unless they open their markets on a reciprocal basis cannot be 
justified on the grounds that such market opening would benefit the less developed 
peoples.110 This may in fact be true, but it is not an argument that it is open to the 
more advantaged people to make.
108 G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008), at 42. For a critique of  the interpersonal test see Lippert-
Rasmussen, ‘Inequality, Incentives and the Interpersonal Test’, 21 Ratio (2008) 421. Elements of  the 
interpersonal test are developed in more detail in Cohen, ‘Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who 
Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?’, 58 Royal Institute of  Philosophy Supplements (2006) 113.
109 Crowley, ‘Why Are Safeguards Needed in a Trade Agreement’, in K. Bagwell, G.A. Bermann, and P.C. 
Mavroidis (eds), Law and Economics of  Contingent Protection in International Trade (2010), at 379.
110 Arguments in this form are not uncommon, and were particularly visible in the context of  recent nego-
tiations between the EU and the ACP Countries: P. Mandelson, The Third Man: Life at the Heart of  New 
Labour (2010), at 400.
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The interpersonal test constitutes a justificatory safeguard rather than an additional 
substantive requirement.111 It forces us to step outside the impersonal abstraction of  
hypothetical consent to consider how the justifications generated by that abstraction 
translate to the world as it is, and to agents and institutions as they actually are. It 
addresses directly the point made earlier about the plurality of  internationally coer-
cive institutions, and the plural relations in which individuals stand to those institu-
tions. While original position reasoning can never be the whole of  justification, which 
must always be translated from thought experiment to concrete practice, insider/out-
sider cases are more prone than closed situations to elide important considerations 
in this transition. The interpersonal test serves as a useful check on our reasoning in 
such cases.
7 From Coercion to Equality in Global Commerce
In the previous sections, I identified three aspects of  international coercion that are 
relevant to its justification. First, I  argued that the effects of  indirect coercion can, 
within limits, be justified by reference to the principle of  self-determination, whereas 
direct coercion must be justified to those who are subject to it in terms of  ends that 
they themselves have reason to share. Secondly, I argued that exclusive coercion may 
be justified in sufficientarian terms, whereas inclusive coercion requires justification 
in distributive terms. Finally, given that international coercion is rarely self-authored, 
I  highlighted the need to examine its justification from the perspectives of  both its 
objects and its authors.
How do we move from this typology, through the Coercion Approach, to the two prin-
ciples of  international economic regulation identified at the beginning of  this essay?
Recall, first, the definition of  ETMs as measures that pursue their goals specifically 
through regulating international economic activity. They will include such measures 
as tariffs and quotas, trade-distorting subsidies, and many non-discriminatory regula-
tions that pursue their goals through their effects on foreign producers or consumers. 
However, the essence of  the distinction between ETMs and DEMs lies in the means by 
which measures of  each type pursue their goals, rather than the formal status of  the 
measures or the nature of  the goals pursued. Measures are understood in terms of  (i) 
the specific actions that they require or prohibit; (ii) the goals that they pursue; and (iii) 
the anticipated causal chain linking the two. For example, a tariff  on imported widgets 
might be understood in terms of  the specific action it requires, namely the payment of  
a duty on imports of  widgets; the goals that it pursues, for example the protection of  
livelihoods in the domestic widget sector; and the proposed causal chain linking the 
two, namely an increase in the price of  imported widgets leading to increased market 
share for domestic widgets and increased prices in the domestic market to the benefit 
of  the domestic widget industry. As described, this would clearly constitute an ETM, as 
there is no plausible account of  the goals it pursues or the means by which it pursues 
111 In Cohen’s approach, the interpersonal test provides a mechanism for applying the discrete value of  com-
munity, which forms no part of  my argument.
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them that does not involve the regulation of  international economic activity. However, 
it is an ETM because of  the goal it pursues, and the means by which it pursues it, not 
because it falls within a pre-defined category of  ‘tariff ’ or ‘trade barrier’. While tariffs 
and quotas will often constitute ETMs, they may not always do so; and many other 
forms of  regulation, including apparently domestic and non-discriminatory mea-
sures, will constitute ETMs under this definition.112
As so defined, ETMs necessarily constitute direct coercion of  outsiders. They pursue 
their goals specifically through the regulation of  international economic activity and, 
by extension, by involving and affecting the interests of  outsiders. ETMs logically pre-
suppose the existence of  international trade; in the absence of  such trade, they would 
be meaningless. Further, it is only by changing patterns of  international activity that 
they pursue their objectives. In so far as international economic activity necessar-
ily involves the activities and interests of  outsiders, ETMs address those outsiders as 
intentional objects. They need not intentionally harm them; but they are intentionally 
and instrumentally used in the context of  ETMs, in a way that they are not by DEMs.
To illustrate, consider again the example of  a tariff  on widget imports, intended 
to promote an importer’s domestic widget industry. Such a tariff  achieves its objec-
tive by raising the price of  imported products, thereby reducing the profits available 
to a foreign importer, reducing his sales volume, or shutting him out of  the market 
entirely. It is not open to the people imposing the tariff  to claim that the effects this has 
on importers are merely unfortunate side effects of  a policy intended to improve the 
position of  domestic industry, or to claim that it did not intend to damage their inter-
ests; the effect on their interests is the causal mechanism whereby the tariff  pursues 
its objective. The causal path runs from the tariff  through the effects on importers’ 
interests to the benefits for domestic industry.
Further, the coercion effected by ETMs is, in general, inclusive. As argued above, inter-
national economic activity constitutes productive cooperation, raising the problem of  
distributive justice. In so far as ETMs regulate international economic activity, they nec-
essarily govern participation therein and the distribution of  benefits therefrom. Thus, 
the effect of  the widget tariff  in our example is to divert opportunities from outsiders to 
insiders, conferring greater benefits on domestic widget producers or imposing costs on 
foreigners. The tariff, and ETMs generally, is distributive in the sense discussed above.113
112 In determining whether particular measures constitute ETMs or DEMs, I adopt Dworkin’s method of  con-
structive interpretation: see generally R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1998), at 52–68. We are concerned to 
assess the justice of  institutions adopted by peoples. To the extent that goals and means are part of  that 
assessment, constructive interpretation provides a way to attribute these to institutions, as products of  
peoples as collective agents, without reducing to the plans of  particular persons. Dworkin’s justification 
criterion must, however, be modified to consider the interpretation that is best from the perspective of  
the relevant people, which in turn suggests having regard to the values of  that people’s public culture: 
ibid., at 107. Alternative approaches that might be adopted to make this judgment include examining the 
subjective preferences of  legislators and aggregating the preferences of  citizens; however, problems of  
attribution and aggregation lead me to prefer Dworkin’s approach.
113 A more direct argument for viewing tariffs as inclusive coercion, albeit less relevant in practice, would 
focus on their terms of  trade effects: Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz, supra note 3, at 255–256. Cf. Bagwell 
and Staiger, supra note 3, at 13–41.
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A contrary view might claim that many ETMs constitute exclusive coercion, in so 
far as they exclude foreign products from the domestic market, preventing produc-
tive cooperation in the relevant area. In a limited number of  cases, this may indeed 
be the case.114 However, in most cases we can assume that the effects of  ETMs are 
inclusive for one of  two reasons. First, the international economy cannot be simply 
divided into products or indeed industries. Each area of  the economy affects many oth-
ers.115 Excluding imports or exports of  a particular product does not prevent economic 
cooperation. It merely changes its profile so that cooperation is concentrated in some 
areas rather than others, with consequent distributive effects.116 With the exception 
of  an entirely closed economy, restrictions in one area should therefore be regarded as 
inclusive. Secondly, the effects of  ETMs cannot be entirely understood at the point of  
application; their objects and effects are usually dynamic rather than static.117 Thus, 
the purpose of  the widget tariff  in the above example might be to increase the scale 
and in consequence the efficiency of  the domestic industry, with a view to competing 
more effectively in international markets. By temporarily limiting cooperation, its goal 
is to shift the distribution of  benefits from the wider scheme of  cooperation in favour 
of  the relevant people.
Contrast this with the position of  DEMs, which can be defined as measures that pur-
sue their goals through regulating domestic economic activity, or through regulating 
economic activity generally. These do not specifically regulate international economic 
activity, and as such cannot be said to directly coerce outsiders in the way that ETMs 
do. They may have effects on international economic activity, but these are side effects 
of  their primary purpose, which is to regulate domestic economic activity.
Given these characteristics of  ETMs, and bearing in mind the interpersonal test, 
we next ask how such measures can be justified. What reasons can a people adopting 
such measures offer to those persons and peoples that it thereby coerces, reasons that 
they can themselves be expected to share, and that justify the distributive effects of  
these measures? In the Rawlsian constructivist scheme equal freedom, expressed at 
the individual level in terms of  individual liberties and social primary goods, includ-
ing economic advantage, and at the collective level in terms of  the self-determination 
of  peoples, exhausts the ends that persons and peoples necessarily share. It is thus in 
terms of  that equal freedom that ETMs must be justified in the first instance. However, 
as outlined above, self-determination can play only a limited role in justifying direct 
inclusive coercion. We must therefore look instead to the egalitarian considerations 
evoked by equal access to social primary goods, and in particular economic advan-
tage. ETMs must be justified, if  they can be justified at all, in terms of  the effects they 
have on the distribution of  economic advantage. However, such justifications will be 
available only where the interests invoked are those of  the globally less advantaged. 
Principles of  reciprocity, generality, and moral equality combine to preclude the jus-
tification of  ETMs adopted in order to benefit globally more advantaged individuals 
114 Space limitations preclude fuller discussion of  this point here.
115 Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz, supra note 3, at 142–146.
116 Ibid., at 146–157.
117 Ray, supra note 97, at 650–700; Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz, supra note 3, at 286–298, 302–309.
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at the expense of  those less advantaged; while those same principles preclude those 
more advantaged individuals from objecting to ETMs adopted by others in pursuits 
of  globally egalitarian goals. The Coercion Approach thus leads us directly to the EGC 
Principle:
Principle of  Equality in Global Commerce: ETMs are just if  and only if  they pursue global 
equality of  individual opportunity, through improving the position of  less advantaged persons, 
subject to a reasonable principle of  self-determination.
If  equal freedom exhausts the ends that persons and peoples necessarily share, it also 
exhausts the grounds on which unilateral ETMs may be justified. Whereas a given per-
son or people may be firmly committed to other ends, for example animal rights, they 
have no basis for directly coercing others in pursuit of  them. Others may share that 
commitment, which they may jointly pursue through international cooperation; but 
it can provide no basis for coercing outsiders, and to do so is incompatible with their 
status as free and equal moral persons.118 Therefore, in the absence of  clear evidence 
that the relevant end is in fact widely shared by the relevant international community, 
it is difficult to see how such ends could justify ETMs.
The constraints on justifying ETMs do not, however, apply to DEMs. In so far as 
these do not directly coerce outsiders, they do not require justification in terms of  ends 
outsiders themselves have reason to share. The principle of  self-determination pro-
vides a basis on which the effects of  DEMs on outsiders can be justified, provided they 
respect outsiders’ equal right to self-determination. Therefore, in considering DEMs we 
can pursue our collective goals without concern for the effects they have on outsiders, 
subject to an appropriate self-determination side constraint such as Rawls’ Duty of  
Assistance.119 The Duty of  Assistance, with its negative corollary, imposes constraints 
on peoples to consider the implications of  DEMs for outsiders, but only where the effect 
of  the relevant measure would be to impair basic rights or to deprive another people 
of  the resources it requires to become or remain well ordered. This may preclude a 
118 This does not imply that states may not adopt regulations to reduce animal cruelty, but only that they 
may not use ETMs for this purpose. However, in many cases regulations that on their face appear unre-
lated to international economic activity may in fact constitute ETMs where the specific good they are 
intended to promote will be affected only through the effects of  the relevant measure on international 
economic activity. For an alternative view see Howse and Langille, ‘The Seal Products Dispute and Why 
the WTO Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justified by Noninstrumental Moral Values’, 37 Yale J Int’l L 
(2012) 367. Cross-border pollution and climate change are more difficult as these represent cases where 
outsiders may directly harm members of  a community. The prevention of  physical harm to members of  a 
community resulting from the actions of  outsiders may provide a legitimate basis for coercing outsiders. 
However, these arguments can often be better expressed in egalitarian or self-determination terms. This 
has the benefit of  bringing into view the equal claim of  outsiders to be protected from polluting activ-
ity by insiders, and potential historic claims of  climate injustice. Human rights are another case where 
ETMs might be justifiable when directed against repressive regimes; again, however, these often reduce 
to self-determination or egalitarian claims. Their added significance is that they represent a case where 
ETMs might be adopted by one state for the benefit of  persons in another state, pushing the limits of  the 
interpersonal test.
119 In so far as the indirect coercion of  outsiders implicit in DEMs is justified under the principle of  self-
determination, the Duty of  Assistance can be regarded as a necessary element of  that justification which 
vindicates the equal right of  outsiders to self-determination as well ordered peoples.
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people from adopting certain measures or (more commonly) require that measures be 
adapted to minimize the adverse effects on the relevant outsiders. This is not a general 
obligation, however, and applies only below the threshold where the effect of  the mea-
sure would be such as to engage the Duty of  Assistance.
The consequence of  this argument, then, is that ETMs will be just only to the extent 
that they comply with the EGC Principle; while DEMs require justification only at the 
margin where they impact on the basic rights or self-determination of  others. These 
two claims combine to provide a comprehensive account of  the justice of  state action 
in the international economic sphere.
8 EGC and the Justice of  NPRPPMs
The Coercion Approach, when complemented by a more nuanced account of  inter-
national coercion, thus implies the EGC Principle and its DEM corollary. It remains to 
consider how these principles might illuminate the problems and practices of  inter-
national economic regulation, and in particular of  world trade law. In this section, 
I consider non-product related processes and production methods (NPRPPMs) as an 
example of  a problem that can be analysed under EGC.
NPRPPMs are regulations adopted by a state, whether as border measures or domes-
tic regulations, which treat products differently depending on the methods used in 
their production, even though these methods have no effect on the physical constitu-
tion of  the relevant product. The most prominent NPRPPMs have been environmental 
regulations that restrict the sale of  products produced by methods deemed to have 
unacceptable environmental costs. The US regulations considered in the Tuna/Dophin 
and Shrimp/Turtle disputes are clear examples. Two GATT Panels in Tuna/Dolphin 
concluded that such measures constituted quantitative restrictions prohibited under 
Article XI of  the GATT, that they could not constitute domestic regulations under 
Article III, and furthermore that they could not benefit from the general exemptions in 
Article XX.120 In Shrimp/Turtle the AB took a different approach.121 No argument was 
made in that case that NPRPPMs could constitute domestic regulations under Article 
III. Rather, the AB assumed that the measures constituted quantitative restrictions, 
but found that they could in principle benefit from the general exemptions, albeit that 
in the particular circumstances of  the initial complaint they did not meet the require-
ments of  Article XX.
The approach to NPRPPMs in these cases has faced significant criticism. Critics 
argue that there is no textual basis for excluding such measures from either Article 
III or Article XX, that as a matter of  treaty law the relevant question is whether differ-
ences in production methods affect the likeness or competitive relationship between 
products, and that as a matter of  economic principle there is no basis for treating 
120 GATT Panel Report, US – Restrictions on Imports of  Tuna, 3 Sept. 1991 (GATT/DS21); GATT Panel Report, 
US – Restrictions on Imports of  Tuna, 16 June 1994 (GATT/DS29).
121 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 12 Oct. 1998 
and Art. 21.5 Appellate Body Report, 22 Oct. 2001 (DS58/WTO).
1
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NPRPPMs differently from other measures.122 It is not my purpose here to review this 
criticism, but only to show how EGC understands NPRPPMs, and how it would sug-
gest resolving the issues in these cases.
NPRPPMs will generally constitute ETMs. To the extent that they concern them-
selves with the means whereby imported products are produced, they are concerned 
directly to regulate international economic activity in particular. Their concern for 
foreign production is not a side effect of  their concern for domestic trade or consump-
tion; rather, the latter are regarded as a means of  affecting the former.123 Further, their 
effect is inclusive, affecting the distribution of  costs and benefits accruing from inter-
national trade in the relevant products. They do not simply prevent cooperation in a 
relevant sphere; rather, they dictate the terms on which that cooperation will proceed.
As such, whereas regulations on tuna or shrimp imports that are concerned with 
the safety, or indeed the cosmetic appearance, of  products can be justified directly 
under the principle of  self-determination, NPRPPMs must be justified to those subject 
to them, namely foreign producers, in terms of  ends they themselves have reason to 
share. While domestic regulations that are genuinely domestically oriented are, on 
this view, not the proper concern of  those foreign producers they affect, NPRPPMs 
clearly are. This does not depend on any contestable claim that environmental prac-
tices cannot be a proper concern for an importing people. Rather, it emphasizes that 
to the extent that they are such a concern, justification is owed to affected producers 
in exporting states in a way that it is not for purely domestic regulations. Further, 
EGC claims that, ceteris paribus, an acceptable justification must invoke global equality 
of  individual opportunity, subject to a reasonable principle of  self-determination. The 
fact that an importing people values the lives of  dolphins or sea-turtles cannot alone 
provide a sufficient justification.
However, EGC also recognizes that where ends other than equal freedom are in fact 
shared amongst relevant communities, this may provide a basis for action in pursuit 
of  those ends. This raises a contingent factual question about the extent to which 
those coerced do in fact share the relevant end. In a legalized context such as the WTO, 
we might find such evidence in bilateral and multilateral treaties to which the relevant 
states are parties, or in soft-law instruments such as declarations and resolutions of  
competent international bodies. Whatever evidence is chosen, the key point is that the 
inquiry seeks an internationally shared standard against which to judge the relevant 
measures, whereas in the case of  purely domestic measures, the appropriate standard 
is the values of  the regulating community.
How can this argument inform the interpretation of  the relevant WTO provisions? 
It suggests that purely domestic measures, of  the kind regulated under Articles I and 
III, are properly judged by domestic standards, provided they are genuinely domestic 
in orientation. A non-discrimination principle, complemented by a modified ‘aims and 
122 Charnovitz, ‘The Law of  Environmental PPMs in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of  Illegality’, 27 Yale J 
Int’l L (2002) 59; Howse and Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – an Illusory Basis for Disciplining 
“Unilateralism” in Trade Policy’, 11 EJIL (2000) 249. More generally see C.R. Conrad, Processes and 
Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law: Interfacing Trade and Social Goals (2011).
123 There may be marginal cases where this does not hold: Howse and Regan, supra note 122, at 279.
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effects’ test of  the kind arguably adopted by the AB in Asbestos serves to ensure that 
domestic measures do not covertly address international economic activity.124 On the 
other hand, measures that pursue their goals through their effects on trade, whether 
conventionally ‘protectionist’ measures or NPRPPMs, will violate Articles I, III, and/
or XI, and will be justifiable only where they pursue some shared goal, whether the 
a priori shared end of  equal freedom or some contingently shared goal as evidenced 
by the practices of  the relevant communities. A  number of  GATT provisions can 
be understood as addressing measures in pursuit of  equal freedom, most obviously 
Article XVIII (Governmental Assistance for Economic Development), Part IV (Trade 
and Development), and the Enabling Clause. On the other hand Article XX, particu-
larly if  complemented in future by Article 31(3)(c) of  the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of  Treaties, can be understood as addressing measures potentially justified in 
pursuit of  contingently shared goals including in particular environmental goals. The 
chapeau to Article XX and the nuanced application of  that provision in the AB deci-
sions in Shrimp/Turtle can be understood as expressing the terms on which states can 
adopt ETMs in pursuit of  goals that all have in fact identified as worth pursuing.
EGC thus tells a plausible story about the function of  the relevant provisions, and 
the reasons for being particularly concerned about ETMs. It explains why, despite tex-
tual ambiguity, NPRPPMs should be regarded as in general prohibited under Articles 
I, III, and/or XI, and how the various exception provisions should be interpreted in 
their application to such measures. It thereby brings valuable conceptual clarity to 
this area, making sense of  principles that have resisted purely economic explanation.
The critical and explanatory power of  EGC derives from its distinctions amongst 
categories of  measure, and its close attention to the coercive relations between per-
sons and institutions, and the justifications those relations evoke. Further, its explan-
atory power is not limited to the specific case of  NPRPPMs. Thus, EGC provides a 
novel account of  the problem of  protectionism more generally, seeing it not in terms 
of  inefficiency, but rather as a case where peoples adopt measures that pursue their 
goals through their effects on outsiders, without being justifiable to those outsiders. 
It accounts for the various Special and Differential Treatment provisions in the WTO 
covered agreements as expressing, albeit imperfectly, the claim of  less developed coun-
tries to adopt ETMs in pursuit of  equal freedom, understood in terms of  their own 
economic development. It explains the problematic field of  trade remedies disciplines 
as policing the justificatory boundary between egalitarian concerns of  equal freedom 
and sufficientarian considerations of  self-determination. A  full treatment of  these 
issues within the EGC framework constitutes a fully-fledged research agenda, and is 
beyond the scope of  this article. It therefore suffices to note, in conclusion, that in 
being able to address these questions at all EGC represents a significant advance on 
existing accounts of  distributive justice in international economic regulation.
124 Hudec, ‘GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an Aim and Effects Test’, 32 Int’l 
Lawyer (1998) 619; Porges and Trachtman, ‘Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The Resurrection 
of  Aim and Effects’, 37 J World Trade (2003) 783.
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